Regular readers know that I have tried to accumulate all the information I can about the 2005 NIE on Iran’s nuclear program — it is interesting in its own right and as a predecessor to the much misunderstood 2007 NIE. (I did my best to create a detailed account in “NIE on Iran’s WMD Programs,” March 27, 2007.)

In addition to the information collected in that March 2007 ArmsControlWonk post, the only other details are available in the unclassified summary of the 2007 NIE, which contains a chart that compares the 2005 and 2007 versions (see below).

Now, in the September 18, 2009 edition of RL34544 Iran’s Nuclear Program: Status, CRS analyst Paul Kerr releases the name of the NIE, as well as some description of the 2001 NIE, down in footnote 86:

Although the 2005 NIE stated that “Iran currently is determined to develop nuclear weapons despite its international obligations and international pressure,” that assessment was somewhat qualified. Titled “Iran’s Nuclear Program: At A Crossroads,” the estimate stated that Iran was not “immovable” on the question of pursuing a nuclear weapons program and also addressed the possibility that Tehran may not have had such a program. Moreover, the word “determined” was used in lieu of “pursuing” a nuclear weapon because the authors believed the latter to be a stronger term. The NIE was issued as a Memorandum to Holders of NIE 2001-15HC, “Iran’s Nuclear Weapons Program: Multifaceted and Poised
to Succeed, But When?”

The name — “Iran’s Nuclear Program: At A Crossroads” — is actually kind of useful. Analysts within the IC often grumble about the focus on the phrase “Iran currently is determined to develop nuclear weapons.” Out of context, analysts argue, that phrase distorts the overall tone of the 2005 NIE, which was more ambiguous. I recall one meeting where an exasperated senior IC analyst complained that even the title — “At a Cross Roads” — indicated the contingent nature of Iran’s pursuit of nuclear weapons. (Don’t get me started on their view of “pursue” either.)

In case you are interested, here is the comparison chart from the 2007 NIE.

Key Differences Between the Key Judgments of This Estimate
on Iran’s Nuclear Program and the May 2005 Assessment

2005 IC Estimate 2007 National Intelligence Estimate
Assess with high confidence that Iran currently is determined to develop nuclear weapons despite its international obligations and international pressure, but we do not assess that Iran is immovable. Judge with high confidence that in fall 2003, Tehran halted its nuclear weapons program. Judge with high confidence that the halt lasted at least several years. (DOE and the NIC have moderate confidence that the halt to those activities represents a halt to Iran’s entire nuclear weapons program.) Assess with moderate confidence Tehran had not restarted its nuclear weapons program as of mid-2007, but we do not know whether it currently intends to develop nuclear weapons. Judge with high confidence that the halt was directed primarily in response to increasing international scrutiny and pressure resulting from exposure of Iran’s previously undeclared nuclear work. Assess with moderate-to-high confidence that Tehran at a minimum is keeping open the option to develop nuclear weapons.
We have moderate confidence in projecting when Iran is likely to make a nuclear weapon; we assess that it is unlikely before early-to-mid next decade. We judge with moderate confidence that the earliest possible date Iran would be technically capable of producing enough highly enriched uranium (HEU) for a weapon is late 2009, but that this is very unlikely. We judge with moderate confidence Iran probably would be technically capable of producing enough HEU for a weapon sometime during the 2010-2015 time frame. (INR judges that Iran is unlikely to achieve this capability before 2013 because of foreseeable technical and programmatic problems.)
Iran could produce enough fissile material for a weapon by the end of this decade if it were to make more rapid and successful progress than we have seen to date. We judge with moderate confidence that the earliest possible date Iran would be technically capable of producing enough highly enriched uranium (HEU) for a weapon is late 2009, but that this is very unlikely.

Source: “Iran: Nuclear Intentions and Capabilities,” National Intelligence Council, November 2007.