Comments on: Ros-Lehtinen on Arms Control

By: bobbymike

bobbymike — Fri, 11 Dec 2009 05:46:43 +0000

I consider myself a defense hawk but agree that the massive nuclear “Cold War” force needed to be dramatically reduced for obvious reasons.

What I want to see is a force level agreement 1500, 1650 0r 2200 warheads, whatever, with detailed modernization plans.

The Mitchell Institute for Airpower Studies has just released a force structure paper that basically concludes the US in on the way to a Dyad (ICBMs and SLBMs) Also, the Heritage Foundation release a Web Memo that basically says forget about START just improve and codify SORT.

As I have stated there is really no reason, strategically, to reduce arsenals below 2200 warheads but, for me, the most alarming aspect is that over the last 15 or so years there has been no agreement on the modernization of the nuclear enterprise that will support the deterrent force at any level.

By: Stephen Young

Stephen Young — Thu, 10 Dec 2009 21:54:15 +0000

Closer, but I still disagree with the argument it was a delaying tactic. The bottom line for SASC really was that we needed a better policy than the Bush NPR. And they agreed with House appropriators that a policy framework would help solve the overall drift in the nuclear arena. It was not support for RRW that drove either HASC’s commission or SASC’s NPR; it was a real (and accurate) sense that a new consensus was needed on nuclear weapons to get anything done, no matter what it was.

By: anon

anon — Thu, 10 Dec 2009 19:35:16 +0000

Stephen, try it this way. Congress has been unable, for years, to reach a sustainable agreement on a way forward on maintaining/sustaining the nuclear arsenal. One of the key talking points that keeps undermining funding is the idea that we should not fund new programs until we agree on a role for nuclear weapons into the future and on the numbers and types we will need for that role. That’s the big question for the NPR. But, they decided to ask it again in FY2008 bills because 1) they didn’t like the Bush Admin’s answers, and 2) they couldn’t sustain an agreement on whether or not to fund RRW. You may claim they would have asked for the NPR just to answer the big question. But that’s not why Congress asks for studies. Studies are a delaying tactic, with the hope that the results of the study will push Members towards one side or the other so that a consensus becomes more evident. SASC and HASC generally wanted RRW, with some linkages; Hobson had soured on it. HASC and SASC hoped they could get it back if they had authoritative studies to point to that supported it. Hence the Strategic Posture Commission (sponsored in HASC) and the NPR (sponsored in SASC.) Unfortunately (or fortunately) the ball moved while they were waiting for the studies, the jargon changed and the goals changed. We are still looking for a consensus on how to move forward on sustaining/maintaining the arsenal, but a program known as “RRW” is no longer in the mix.

By: Jeffrey Lewis

Jeffrey Lewis — Thu, 10 Dec 2009 17:25:04 +0000

Anybody else want in here?

By: Stephen Young

Stephen Young — Thu, 10 Dec 2009 17:09:34 +0000

Wow, Jeffrey, that is the first time since I’ve known you that I can say, with close to absolute confidence, that you are flat out wrong. (That is a compliment.)

The SASC mandate for the NPR was not about the RRW. Really.

By: Jeffrey Lewis

Jeffrey Lewis — Thu, 10 Dec 2009 04:49:26 +0000

Stephen:

I remember it exactly like Anon describes it.

By: Stephen Young

Stephen Young — Thu, 10 Dec 2009 03:56:28 +0000

Anon, that is not right. SASC supported RRW, but it was no where near as high a priority for them as it was for NNSA and the labs. SASC supported the RRW study, not necessarily producing the warhead. The NPR was mandated for big picture reasons – look at the language in the requirement. If RRW had been the priority, you would have seen it dramatically in the mandate; it wasn’t.

By: anon

anon — Wed, 09 Dec 2009 19:18:53 +0000

Stephen, the SASC mandated the NPR because it realized it did not have the ability to make its support for the RRW stick in the appropriations committees. It was too easy for critics to raise questions about why we needed to spend money on this if we didn’t even know why we had nukes or how long we were going to keep them (that may not have been the real reason for the skepticism, but it was a potent debating point). When Congress can’t reach a decision on a program, and make it stick (which was the real problem with RRW), then they request a study. Its tradition.

By: Stephen Young

Stephen Young — Wed, 09 Dec 2009 17:47:07 +0000

I don’t think it is accurate to say Congress required to the Nuclear Posture Review to postpone the decision on the RRW. The mandate for the NPR came out of the Senate Armed Services Subcommittee, which generally supported the RRW. Congressional opposition to the RRW was led by the House Energy and Water Appropriations Committee, which spent many words in repeated bills calling for a policy framework justifying RRW before it would agree to support it, but never mandated an NPR (and one could argue doesn’t have the authority to do so).

By: anon

anon — Wed, 09 Dec 2009 14:20:53 +0000

Bobbymike, they already tried that in the Defense Auth bill. Problem is that the Congress cannot force the Admin to spend money in future budgets, and START ratification only happens once. There really is no funding requirement to implement START, as services absorb costs in their O&M budgets.

On another note. Maybe the reference to China, and the desire to size forces to address “China threats” really means they want to reduce U.S. arsenal to 500 warheads???? Sorry, I’m tired this morning, so I’m feeling snarky.