Each nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; and not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices.

Article II

Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to receive the transfer from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or of control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; and not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

From The Dead Hand:

In 1974, when he had been in the Senate for only a year, Nunn toured NATO headquarters in Brussels and American military bases in Germany and Italy. If war were to come in Europe, the first battlefield would be divided Germany.
Soviet war plans called for a massive sweep of sixty divisions from East Germany and Czechoslovakia into West Germany, reaching the German-French border within thirteen to fifteen days. They would face NATO’s tactical or battlefield nuclear weapons. American scientists and engineers had created tiny warheads that could fit into small missiles and artillery shells. The firepower of these miniature nukes was an alternative to using massive numbers of troops. The West had deployed seven thousand nuclear weapons in Europe during the period when Nunn visited.
A substantial number of U.S. aircraft and missiles were on five minute alert in case of a crisis.
At a U.S. tactical nuclear weapons base in Germany, where bunkers held warheads and shells, Nunn was shown the relatively small devices, including warheads that could be easily moved by one or two men. Nunn was reassured by the commanders that all the weapons were secure. As he left the building, a sergeant shook hands with him. In his hand, Nunn felt a piece of folded paper. He slipped it into his pocket.
“Senator Nunn,” it said, “please meet me and some of my guard buddies at the barracks around 6 tonight after work. I have very important information for you.”
That night, Nunn and his staff director, Frank Sullivan, went to the
barracks. The sergeant and “three or four of his fellow sergeants related a horror story to me,” Nunn later recalled. “A story of a demoralized military after Vietnam. A story of drug abuse. A story of alcohol abuse. A story of U.S. soldiers actually guarding the tactical nuclear weapons
while they were stoned on drugs. The stories went on and on for over an hour.” Nunn left “thoroughly shaken,” he said.

Fun aside, this breach of security at Kleine-Brogel is an absolutely inacceptable incident which, hopefully, will be a long overdue wakeup-call for the belgian military (Watch duty at a military airbase, not to speak of a nuclear storage facility, by “professionals” with unloaded rifles? Leaving gates open to keep them from freezing shut? Forty minutes or more until the intruders were intercepted? Gosh, these dudes really are on the peace-dividend-drug…on the other hand, this may offer an explanation why Belgium was so easily overrun twice by german forces in the not too distant past).
Another question is: I always thought there was an additional U.S.A.F. security detachment at those storage facilities, especially in and around the ‘special’ shelters themselves – where were those guys at that time?

Atleast the vehicle is exactly similar.

Thanks to Oliver Meier, who has done a better job than anyone to keep abreast of the debate — such as it is — within NATO over the B61s. Any time I write something, I reach for his articles in Arms Control Today.

KME said what I was thinking — I didn’t want to be too alarmist in the post. His/her wry comment reminds me that Murphy is certified to handle nuclear weapons.

Finally, yes, I believe the nuclear weapons are still there. In January 2008, the Belgian Defense Minister Pieter De Crem slipped up and admitted it during a visit to the base.

Finally, I found this little nugget from 2008, after the Blue Ribbon report suggested security problems at theE European airbases:

A Belgian Defense Ministry spokesman, Commander Olivier Séverin, denied that security was lax at the Kleine Brogel Air Base in northeastern Belgium, where the FAS estimates the U.S. keeps 20 bombs. “We have professionalized the guards in all our installations,” he said. “These are not conscripts but professional soldiers. Not only that, but everyone is trained specifically for security at air bases. The proof is that there have been no major incidents at our installations.”

“NATO officials also condemn the [U.S. Air Force blue ribbon review about security problems at European nuclear weapon bases] for being misleading. ‘If conscripts are used to provide security, so what? These are well-trained soldiers,’ [Guy Roberts, NATO deputy assistant secretary-general for weapons of mass destruction policy and director for nuclear policy] told Arms Control Today. ‘And the necessity to repair a support building is not necessarily a security issue. If there is a hole in a fence, that gets repaired,’ he said.
European officials also argued that the report was unfair because the Air Force inspectors applied stricter U.S. security standards, applicable to the inner perimeter of the actual nuclear weapons storage area, to the outer perimeter that is guarded by allies. As a result, NATO does not see any need to take additional measures to improve the security at European nuclear weapons bases.”

In retrospect, this sounds mostly like propaganda. Eighteen months later, there are still gaping holes in security fences and training of host nation guards is obviously insufficient.

It is time that Parliamentarians in all host countries start asking some serious questions about security at nuclear weapon sites on their territory, including U.S. bases. After all: Where were the U.S. guards that are supposed to guard the inner perimeter at Kleine Brogel?

As it looks they entered the base from the northwestern perimeter just north of the old F-84 Thunderstreak and proceeded passing the white concrete apron.

And it’s not only for the crepes also their Chateaubriand is worth for keeping Belgium in the NATO.