Comments on: Plague and Cholera

By: George William Herbert

George William Herbert — Sat, 06 Mar 2010 04:34:46 +0000

So – question.

Do you feel it is more likely that some country would within the forseeable policy future consider, threaten or launch a nuclear attack on civilians, or a CBW attack on civilians?

Controlling nuclear weapons and their use is important, but CW and BW are considered weapons of mass destruction for good reasons as well.

By: anon

anon — Fri, 05 Mar 2010 22:45:26 +0000

I agree with you. I, personally believe that, with declaratory policy, the less said the better. But the pressure is on for the Admin to be definite about whether it intends to use nukes to deter CW and BW. Not that they’d listen to me, but I think that is a mistake. Silence, on that front, is golden. If they say nothing, they will be pushing back from the Bush policy that explicitly threatened nukes for almost everything. They should have many other changes to point to that demonstrate the reduced role for nuclear weapons.

By: Jeffrey Lewis

Jeffrey Lewis — Fri, 05 Mar 2010 21:24:38 +0000

Anon:

I think we agree.

I believe it is a mistake to answer the question of whether we would (or would not) use nuclear weapons to respond to a conventional, CW or BW attack. I want to leave existential deterrence in place. (I happen to think it is a function of the existence of the weapons, but that is another conversation.)

Still, “reserving the right” is conflated with “intends to, maybe tomorrow” — an equally if not more problematic formulation. It does violence to conventional deterrence, creates perverse incentives and is, I suspect, a bluff. (I object to nuclear bluffing.) And — for me this is the key — routine U.S. nuclear weapons decisions are interpreted in the US and elsewhere in light of these peculiar lesser included cases, undermining the role that the weapons do play.

The solution, it seems to me, is to observe that there are no guarantees in life, but that lesser-included (or I would say incidental) cases should not be confused with the purpose of the forces.

Does that demonstrate a reduced role for nuclear weapons? No, but I don’t care for that formulation — Arnie Kanter convinced me that it is logically backward.

The role for nuclear weapons is declining for external reasons (no ideological rivalry, better conventional forces, etc.). Our declaratory policy recognizes the new environment, it doesn’t create it.

On the other hand, this policy does a good bit to correct the record. Domestic and foreign perceptions of US nuclear weapons policy are, in my opinion, somewhat distorted.

Stating the purpose of the forces doesn’t, strictly speaking, reduce their role — but the audience comes away understanding that the role is less than they thought.

Were I advising the President, which of course I am not, I would have encouraged him to simply assert that these weapons play a much smaller role than ever before and that our task is to make sure our forces, policies and posture reflect that reduced role.

And that I file this one under “policies.”

By: Doug

Doug — Fri, 05 Mar 2010 17:00:20 +0000

how about a nuclear posture mulligan? as I recall you observing, the prospective enthusiasm about the potential outcome of the NPR process consistently overlooks the NPR’s structural constraints. Could the NPR begin a wider discussion?

By: kme

kme — Fri, 05 Mar 2010 05:43:37 +0000

Brent Logan: Even under your last hypothetical, the deterrent value would not be completely lost. The potential aggressor must factor in to his calculations the probability of the President changing his mind on the matter when actually pressed by an attack.

This obvious fact (that words are not deeds) is why we have mutual verification in arms control treaties, after all.

By: Brent Logan

Brent Logan — Thu, 04 Mar 2010 23:11:22 +0000

I’m certainly no expert in arms control, but how does the mere existence of nuclear arms provide any deterrent effect without those being deterred believing they might be used? Asked another way, wouldn’t their deterrent effect be lost if the president were to say that the nuclear arms would never be used under any circumstances?

By: anon

anon — Thu, 04 Mar 2010 23:09:56 +0000

Your formula works if you are trying to use the declaratory policy as a guide post in sizing and structuring the nuclear force. If you are sized and structured to deter, and, if necessary, respond to nuclear attacks, then you have enough size and the right structure to do anything else you might want to do (that’s the meaning of a lesser included case, you don’t rule it in or out, but you can do it if and when you decide you need to do it.)

But your formula does not work if you are trying to demonstrate that you have reduced the role of nuclear weapons, or, in other words, reduced the number of circumstances when you might consider using nuclear weapons. If you don’t rule them out, you allow for these circumstances as “lesser included cases.”

Personally, I’m fine with this formula. I don’t think we need to rule in or rule out other cases, I like the ambiguity for deterrence. But your formula does not get to the fundamental question that many people want an answer to: Would we use nuclear weapons to deter or respond to a CW or BW attack? Or a conventional attack.

Or have I misunderstood you, too?