Here is what T-D’ag said: “if we don’t want to improve the safety, if we don’t want to improve the security, if we don’t want to improve the reliability, just keep things the way they are ….”

T-D’ag didn’t say there were some things we couldn’t improve (which is what JASON said); he said there were none that we could. That’s why Feinstein tore him to shreds.

So, you’ve begun your defense by conceding that his statement is fundamentally incorrect. Now you are just hoping to show that he is not a complete fool (which, he’s not); and that there might be some things we can’t do with with existing approaches, such as add surety features to improve safety, security or control.

You note two exceptions: (1) we need either reuse or replacement for intrinsic surety features on re-entry vehicles and (2) we need reuse (but not replacement) for proposed surety features on air-delivered weapons.

I don’t think you read my post. I clearly stated the bulk of first exception: “Replacement would be necessary only in one, extreme instance — an effort to add “intrinsic” surety features (ie those inside the nuclear explosive package) to some reentry vehicle warheads.”

Now I happen think think “reuse” (as opposed to replacement) falls within “things the way they are” (with “refusbishment”); you believe “current LEP practice is limited to refurbishment of individual components.”

Fair enough. As you note, the JASON report uses the phrase “LEP approaches similar to those employed to date” to mean refurbishment. I can understand a narrow reading.

But the range of planned LEPs, as opposed to those executed to date, incorporates some reuse options. For example — to the point about gravity weapons — as you know, NNSA also looked at W84 pit reuse in the B61-12 LEP, in a manner similar to how the W85 was converted to the B61-10.

I gather that is now off the table (no one tells me anything), but I did look at the range of LEP options to include reuse, rather than a more narrow reading. (As it turns out, I happen to support a pit reuse option for the B61-12.)

Either way, it doesn’t make T-D’ag’s statement correct. We can improve the safety, security and reliability with planned life extension programs.

What I find most telling is that, when pushed on the issue, T-D’ag rehashed his RRW talking points about manufacturing — which has nothing to do with surety. He even moaned about acetonitrile, which was a FOGBANK/W76 argument.) After more than a minute on manufacturing, he added 20 seconds of thoughts on surety. It was clearly a secondary concern in his mind.

It seems clear he doesn’t have the slightest idea what the report says. In fact, I would be willing to be he’s never read it.

• Implementation of intrinsic surety features in today’s re-entry systems, using the
technologies proposed to date, would require reuse or replacement LEP options.
• All proposed surety features for today’s air-carried systems could be implemented
through reuse LEP options.

The findings are clear that to add additional surety features would require at least a re-use LEP option and maybe a replacement LEP option. The current LEP practice is limited to refurbishment of individual components. Please refer to the NNSA provided definitions in the Unclassified Executive Summary. Using these definitions, as the JASON study did, and with an understanding of the current program, D’Agostino’s response was substantially correct, and your seventh paragraph above is in error.

Indeed, doing so largely involves the other end of the wonk.

BTW, read T dwag’s bio: he knows v. little about nuclear weapons. All I can gather is that he got where he is since he was in the Navy and may have had some kind of role in cleaning the equipment panels for one of the reactors. Anyone know what qualifies him for his job?