Comments on: Monterey Masters in Nonpro, Terrorism

By: Fred Wehling

Fred Wehling — Wed, 17 Mar 2010 16:15:07 +0000

@miis student: Our goal in developing the program was not to “fix” anything, but to expand the reach and impact of our educational effort in both fields and take it to a new level of excellence. The new program can be customized to fit students’ interests and career plans, but all students have to take core courses in terrorism, WMD proliferation, and science & technology (S&T) as well as write a capstone project. We’re demanding more so our students will get more.

By: miis student

miis student — Tue, 16 Mar 2010 17:33:46 +0000

Not sure I support the whole idea of combining the two. Looking at the course work it appears that a nonproliferation student could get this degree by simply taking the “intro to terrorism” course and a terrorism student could get the degree by taking the “intro to WMD” course. So what will this amount to? Graduates with little knowledge of Nonproliferation or Terrorism (depending on what they choose). Not really a good step towards maintaining the level of prestige the MIIS nonproliferation program has gained since it’s existence. They should have just left things as they were. If it isn’t broken, don’t fix it.

By: John Schilling

John Schilling — Mon, 15 Mar 2010 00:02:22 +0000

I don’t deny that there is a demand for CBRN among at least some terrorist groups, but if the demand isn’t going to be met, it doesn’t matter. And I have seen no evidence of any actual network devoted to meeting that demand. Just individual, ineffectual incidents, with a side order of paranoia.

And yes, if we go far enough down the CBRN food chain, the prospect of a terrorist group managing to obtain e.g. a modest supply of actual Sarin isn’t so trivial that it ought to be wholly neglected.

But neither should it be the focus of discussion. And if “terrorism” is one half of a course of study that also includes “nonproliferation”, I’m pretty sure that it will be. Note that the Monterey curriculum seems to include mandatory courses in nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons technology, but not even an optional course in IED technology. That’s missing the point.

People studying terrorism, need to spend about ninety percent of their time studying what terrorists might do with machine guns and TNT, and why. People studying non-proliferation, need to spend about ninety percent of their time studying the actions of governments and armies. Trying to force both into a single two-year degree program, is I think rather misguided.

By: Andy

Andy — Sun, 14 Mar 2010 23:08:29 +0000

I’ll pass on this one and keep waiting for a “nonproliferation and feminist studies” program to come along.

By: Jessica Varnum

Jessica Varnum — Sun, 14 Mar 2010 20:13:18 +0000

As a graduate of MIIS’s Certificate in Nonproliferation Studies and a current CNS staff member, perhaps I can help clarify something. In the past, students could concentrate in either nonproliferation or terrorism studies within an MA International Policy Studies. The new MA replaces much of the general international policy work with a greater security focus. Students take a certain number of courses in nonproliferation, and other courses on terrorism. While the possibility for CBRN terrorism is certainly a part of their study, it is not per se the focus of the program. To address the questions about career possibilities, many of my peers who graduated from the Certificate program have gone on to work in government, at international organizations such as the IAEA, CTBTO, and OPCW, for think tanks, and to the private sector. I would be happy to discuss the program further with anyone considering it.

By: Richard Metcalf

Richard Metcalf — Sun, 14 Mar 2010 08:23:57 +0000

Don’t forget the Nuclear Security Science and Policy Institute at Texas A&M. The students there are all technicals from the department of nuclear engineering, so you add policy onto an impressive science background for all-source analysis.

By: Bruce A. Roth

Bruce A. Roth — Sun, 14 Mar 2010 07:02:01 +0000

Jefferery,
Is Monterery an arcane wonk term, a play on words, or a typo?

By: bradley laing

bradley laing — Sun, 14 Mar 2010 05:13:24 +0000

“Man-Pants”: Graduates will have to tailor pleated, Oppenhiemer-style suits to pass.

By: Fred Wehling

Fred Wehling — Sun, 14 Mar 2010 02:17:18 +0000

There’s quite a bit of synergy between the two primary foci of there program when you include all CBRN rather than just nuclear. I teach a seminar that includes a terrorist attack plan simulation, so we do indeed have some interesting class projects :-) Please contact me to get more info on the program or to suggest a different acronym.

By: cstan

cstan — Sun, 14 Mar 2010 00:16:46 +0000

John,

As you mentioned, these fields are often misunderstood or disingenuously exploited. However, the overlap is not as small and hypothetical as you suggest. The demand for CBRN is real, as are the trafficking networks that seek to meet that demand: on the demand side see Al-Qaeda’s efforts to acquire nuclear material in the 90s and the more recent case in Maine involving James Cummings; on nuclear security and (possibly) non-state actors see the 2007 raid on the Pelindaba Nuclear Research Center; on the willingness to use CBRN, check out Sheikh Nasir Bin Hamad al-Fahd’s fatwa on WMD or Aum Shinrikyo’s use of Sarin in Tokyo. There are many other cases involving chemicals, toxins, pathogens, and trafficking in nuclear/radiological material. It is plausible to assume that these materials may fall into the wrong hands in the future.

As repugnant as mass-casualty CBRN attacks may seem to us, it is dangerous to engage in mirror-imaging with individuals who espouse apocalyptic-millenarian worldviews. These people often mean what they say and there is evidence to support it. To ensure the threat is properly understood, I think it’s fair to say we need analysts who understand the nexus of extremist ideologies that are hostile to [insert country in adjectival form] interests, CBRN security, and trafficking.