Olli Heinonen has given Yossi Melman a long interview in Ha’aretz regarding the IAEA’s work in Iran.  It is a must read, including the section on Iran’s technical challenges.

Heinonen argues that Iran is slowed not by sabotage, but by the limitations of the P1 design and the difficulty of acquiring components:

Heinonen believes that Iran is still having trouble moving ahead with its nuclear program. Two factors might account for these apparent difficulties. The first is problems in the design of centrifuges: The ones they produce are of the P-1 design, originally a Dutch model that was stolen by the Pakistanis and secretly sold to Iran. The second factor is difficulty in attaining raw materials (including sensitive metals needed for the centrifuges ), both because of international sanctions and the close intelligence surveillance of Iranian procurement networks. Finally, says Heinonen, “perhaps they have a secret plant for uranium enrichment that we do not know about, but there is no solid information pointing to such an operation on a large scale.”

Do you believe that the defects in centrifuge production could be caused by the sabotage efforts of intelligence agencies, such as the CIA or the Mossad?

“Possibly the centrifuges were damaged by sabotage or the acquisition of faulty equipment, but the main thing is that the Iranians wanted to do everything on their own. In contrast to Libya, which purchased all the materials from a smuggling ring headed by the Pakistani Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan, and intended to establish an enrichment plant, Iran decided to purchase only the technology from Pakistan, but to produce everything by itself. In my opinion, the flaws in the centrifuges derive from two interconnected reasons: lack of sufficient knowledge, and difficulty obtaining high-quality material.”