On July 11, a massive explosion ripped through an ammunition dump at the Evangelos Florakis Naval Base in Cyprus.  The explosion and ensuing fire have killed a dozen people, including the commander of the Cypriot Navy. The main power station for the island was also destroyed, creating a dire situation for the island’s residents.

The explosion was caused by 98 canisters of Iranian munitions, containing more than 2,000 tons of explosives, that Cyprus seized en route to Syria in January 2009. They remained sitting at the Naval Base where they were stored, until a wildfire engulfed them. Or so the papers say.

Obviously, the human tragedy is paramount.   But there is also a significant public policy issue related to the enforcement of sanctions against Iran, North Korea and the like.

Cyprus had been reluctant to accept the cargo, ostensibly because it did not have the facilities to store the munitions.

Although Cyprus had more complicated reasons for wanting rid of the munitions, as we will see, the explosion points to a missing element in efforts to interdict illicit cargoes: Clear guidance from the United Nations Security Council on the disposition of seized contraband.

The case of the M/V Monchegorsk, a Russian-owned, Cypriot flagged-ship, is an interesting one.

The saga of the Monchegorsk was covered extensively in the press, especially in Cyprus where, for a time, it was a major political issue.  It is also detailed in more than a dozen cables that have been released by  Wikileaks.  (It is amazing how, for any new story lately, I now check the cable traffic first.)

The story begins with the Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines, an Iranian entity subject to sanctions. IRISL chartered the Monchegorsk to carry a shipment of small arms to Syria in violation of UNSCR 1747. (As it turns out, the practice of using charters to evade sanctions is a relatively recent Iranian innovation for sanctions busting. See: IRANIAN SHIPPING IN A POST-UNSCR 1803 ENVIRONMENT, October 2, 2009)

The United States received “reliable information” that the Monchegorsk was carrying contraband.  The United States and Cyprus have a bilateral shipboarding agreement. The USS SAN ANTONIO interdicted the shipment and, with the permission of the ship’s master, boarded the Monchegorsk on 19 and 20 January 2009. And what to their wondering eyes did appear, but fifty-five crates of illicit gear:

The inspection revealed containers carrying 120 mm, 122 mm, 125 mm, and 160 mm high explosives that originated in Iran and are destined for Syria. Inspection also revealed 7.62 mm shell casings, compressed gunpowder, silver dollar-sized slugs, primer, and magnesium primers.

The United States did not have the legal authority to seize the cargo, but Cyprus did.  The United States pressed Cyprus to divert the ship back to a Cypriot port. (SHIPMENT OF MILITARY-RELATED ITEMS FROM IRAN TO SYRIA, January 22, 2009)

Initially, the Cypriots wanted no part of any interdiction, fearing Syrian retaliation. In 2006, Cyprus interdicted a ship carrying missile radar equipment from North Korea to Syria — and Syria retaliated by opening regular ferry service to the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, the breakaway Northern portion of Cyprus. (CYPRUS WASHING HANDS OF M/V MONCHEGORSK? January 27, 2009)

The fear that Syria might further strengthen diplomatic relations with the TRNC was complicated by a second factor — the Cypriot President is an old-style Non-Aligned Leftist who is far more inclined to side with Iran, Syria, Cuba and Venezuela on such matters. (His Foreign Minister, and possible rival for the Presidency is not.)  “On the Monchegorsk incident,” the US Ambassador to Cyprus Frank Urbancic wrote, “it is clear that the Christofias Palace, not the Kyprianou MFA, is clearly at the helm.” By way of a warrant for this claim, most of the negotiations over the Monchegorsk were handled by the Presidential Diplomatic Coordinator Leonidas Pantelides rather than the MFA. (Although the Foreign Minister makes a small cameo, undermining the President of Cyprus to the UK High Commissioner.)

It took several days for Cyprus to order the ship back to port.  (M/V MONCHEGORSK STILL LOITERING OFF LARNACA , January 28, 2009 and ENGAGING THE ROC REGARDING THE M/V MONCHEGORSK, January 29, 2009)

Characterizing Cypriot cooperation as “half-hearted,” Urbancic wrote, “Only a full-court international press from the UN Security Council and EU convinced Cyprus to summon the vessel to port for a more-thorough inspection and eventual seizure of the cargo.”  (SCENESETTER FOR FM KYPRIANOU’S APRIL 20 VISIT, April 16, 2009)

This process resulted in an amusing note to the captain of the Monchegorsk that read, in part:

Dear Captain Smirnov

The reason that we ask you to direct the ship to Limassol is to ensure that its cargo is in conformity with UN Security  Council Resolutions 1747 (2007) and 1803 (2008).

Any cargo which is not in conformity has to be unloaded at Limassol in order to avoid infringement of the above Resolutions and violation of the Cyprus Ships (Prohibition of  Transportation) Laws 1966-1971 (Law 26/66 as amended).

Captain Smirnov?  Really? Was Captain Morgan on vacation?

Once the ship anchored at the Cypriot port of Limassol, Cypriot officials absolutely opposed bringing the cargo ashore “on safety grounds.” (M/V MONCHEGORSK ANCHORED OFF LIMASSOL, January 29, 2009)

It soon became clear that the Cypriots were in a real bind.  A Cypriot diplomat suggested that Cyprus transfer the cargo to either the UN peacekeeping mission in Cyprus (UNFCYP) or Lebanon (UNIFIL), which operates out of a port in Cyprus. The US Ambassador made polite noises about his “creative thinking” which, in the Foreign Service, is not a compliment. (CYPRUS: GOVERNMENT SEEKING MUTUALLY-PALATABLE END STATE, January 29, 2009)

The Cypriots continued to make clear that they did not want to keep the cargo, owing to “heavy pressure” from Syria and Iran.  They were extraordinarily worried about the legality of the seizure and, in turn, the legality of simply turning the cargo over to a third party.  The US explained that there was “no mechanism” to give the cargo to UNIFIL, but instead suggested giving the cargo to the British (who have bases on Cyprus, which is not something the government likes reminding Cypriots about) or even the French. The Cypriots didn’t like any proposal that didn’t involve the UN and suggested they might ask the UN Sanctions Panel how to proceed. The United States really did not like this idea, for fear of asking Russia’s advice without knowing the answer. (MONCHEGORSK: MFA SEEKING LEGAL OPINIONS, January 30, 2009.)

The standoff continued, with the United Nations Security Council and European Union putting the screws to Cyprus.  At this point, the Germans also offered to take the cargo. (CYPRIOTS STILL WEIGHING OPTIONS ON MONCHEGORSK , February 2, 2009)

The Cypriots turn down the German offer, too, insisting again on a “a blue flag solution” — the involvement of the United Nations.  That left the option of simply asking the UN Sanctions Panel for “guidance” on the disposition of the goods, something the UK High Commissioner made very clear Cyprus should not do.  (M/V MONCHEGORSK: CYPRUS INSISTS ON UN COVER, February 3, 2009) At this point, we get our cameo from Foriegn Minister Kyprianou, who doesn’t much like the President of Cyprus, telling the UK High Commissioner that “these people — pointing at President Demetris Christofias and fellow AKEL party glitterati — had allowed the Monchegorsk to become an ideological, David versus Goliath affair, with ‘little Cyprus’ naturally cozying up to Syria’s David.”

The Cypriots — clearly frustrated with the inability to settle on the disposition of the goods still sitting on the ship — decided to send a letter to the Sanctions Committee asking for guidance. I don’t have a copy of the letter, but here is how the Cypriots described it in the press:

Due to the origin of the cargo, it needs to be examined whether this specific shipment falls within any specific (UN) resolution ban, and it’s from here we expect UN guidance,” Cyprus Foreign Minister Marcos Kyprianou told reporters.

“Depending on the UN reaction, we shall take decisions and act accordingly,” he added.

Urbancic would later characterize this step as “unhelpful,” which is how a diplomat would describe a range of unpleasant behavior up to and including making a sex tape with his daughter.

The really crucial day appears to be February 5.  The morning begins with Pantelides (again, the President’s diplomatic coordinator)  insisting that the cargo must leave Cyprus “in possession of UN.”  Then, it seems, the Cypriots realize that the Russians will not bail them out — the “guidance” gambit has failed. A few hours later, Pantelides calls back to say Cyprus is now interested in finding a third party to take the cargo, suggesting Malta.  (He explains that Germany would be too high profile.) (MONCHEGORSK: CYPRIOTS BEGINNING TO SQUIRM, February 5, 2009)

It is clear, at this point, that the Cypriot government is under incredible pressure to accept the cargo, but is desperately trying to develop the Malta solution. The US again offers to provide diplomatic and technical assistance with the disposition of the cargo, which is nice but not exactly what the Cypriots want at that moment. (MONCHEGORSK: CYPRUS FLESHING OUT MALTA IDEA, CONSIDERING OTHERS, February 6, 2009).

Then, suddenly, the Cypriots crack. It isn’t clear what happens. Maybe the President shoots down the Malta proposal.  Maybe Malta shoots down the Malta proposal.  Maybe the Russians run out of patience. One way or another, on February 12, the Russian Foreign Minister emerges from a meeting with his Turkish counterpart explaining that “the only correct thing to do is to support the steps made by the Cypriot side.”   (The Cypriots also send another letter to the UN Sanctions Committee the same day.)

Then,on February 13, the  Cypriots begin unloading the cargo from the Monchegorsk. At this point, Cyprus releases a terse statement:

The Republic of Cyprus has decided to unload the material on the ship Monchegorsk and keep it on Cyprus,” the statement said.

“The Republic of Cyprus has already informed the UN Security Council sanctions committee of its decision. No risk is involved in keeping the cargo,” it said, without elaborating.

According to one local press report, the cargo was placed in a temporary storage facility constructed over a few days in February 2009.  It appears the munitions were in the same facility until the explosion. (According to the son of the Cypriot Navy Commander killed in the explosion, his father “pleaded for their removal but was ignored by the government.”)

A mid-level Foreign Ministry contact explains that “all the major players” are satisfied with the solution.  When pressed whether that includes Syria and Iran, he says “it seems so.” (MONCHEGORSK: CARGO OFFLOADED, February 13, 2009 )

On February 19, the Cypriots announce that the ship sans its illicit cargo is free to leave.

What the hell happened?

The Associated Press carried a strange March 4 report that indicated Syria was still pressuring Cyprus over the cargo, although it must have been clear by that point that Cyprus could not fork over the goods.  But Cyprus also refused all offers of assistance for disposing of the material.

On March 29, the United States circulates a draft of a letter from the UN Sanctions Committee that says little about about the disposition of the cargo beyond encouraging the Cypriots to ask for help. (USUN INSTRUCTION: IRAN SANCTIONS COMMITTEE EFFORTS ON MONCHEGORSK , March 29, 2009.)

Careful readers will also note that, on June 10, 2009, the US and Cyprus held a bilateral meeting on arms destruction. This was a MANPADS-related meeting and, as far as I can tell from another cable, unrelated to the disposition of the cargo intended for Syria.

So there the cargo sat in the hot Mediterranean sun, at least until Monday.

It would have been better if we have given Cyprus a UN-sanctioned route to transfer control of the material to a third party.

It turns the out the munitions were not safe in Cyprus, although that is not the real reason that Nicosia wanted no part of the seizure.  (And it is difficult to fault Western policymakers who repeatedly offered technical assistance.) Yet this will be a convenient excuse for other states, perhaps those in Southeast Asia, that may be reluctant to interdict illicit shipments for fear of retaliation by Iran or others. Didn’t you see what happened in Cyprus?  We can’t possibly order a ship carrying such dangerous weapons into one of our major ports. We don’t even have the proper storage facilities.

Which brings us back to the United Nations: The Cypriots desperately wanted the United Nations to order them to turn over the cargo.  It is not hard to understand why.  If Cyprus has a choice in the fate of the cargo, then Nicosia is subject to coercion by Syria.  If, on the other hand, Nicosia simply cannot comply with Syria’s demands, then coercion is futile.  This is Tom Schelling’s point about what he called “the old business of burning bridges” — “maneuvering into a position where one clearly cannot yield.” Nicosia wanted the UN to burn its bridges.

That would suggest that it might be a useful thing for the Security Council, in elaborating on the obligations outlined in UNSCR 1540, to enjoin states seizing illicit goods to forfeit their  possession to a designated United Nations entity, which in turn would arrange for disposal. There are a variety of options that might work, from supervised destruction under UNMOVIC to a model of delegated disposal under the sanctions committees. I haven’t thought through the modalities carefully, beyond observing that leaving disposal to the discretion of individual states has significant disadvantages that, by now, should be obvious.

It’s late, I’m tired, I ‘m sure there are lots of typos and other oddities.  The last paragraph may not even be in English. I will deal with it in the morning.

Update | 14 July 2011 I mistakenly presumed that the Cypriot rationale for handing the weapons over to UNIFIL was that the small arms were headed for Hezbollah.  Although there were press reports that the arms might be headed to Hezbollah or Hamas, the cables are silent about the destination beyond Syria. Cyprus wanted to surrender the seized cargo to UNIFIL, because it operates out of the port of Limassol, where the M/V Monchegorsk was anchored.