Greetings from Hiroshima, Japan — or, as I like to say, within range of a Nodong.
As you can see, North Korea appears to have paraded a Hwaseong-13 (KN-08) without the camouflage we saw last time. The Scuds got a makeover, too. This is now consistent with previous parade appearance of Nodongs and Musudans.
I am still looking for decent images of the DPRK parade. There seems to be a bunch of really interesting stuff.
For example: Who the hell are these guys?
And WTF is this:
Steph Hagard wrote a great little piece on the Chong Chon Gang interdiction. I have only a few additional comments.
1. I find the story that Cuba was sending the equipment to North Korea for refurbishment plausible. In fact, it resolves a minor mystery. In 2006, the Cuban’s revealed new mobile launchers for the S-75 and S-125, leading many to people to ask which country performed the upgrade.
Two new mobile versions of the Soviet-era S-75 (SA-2 ‘Guideline’) and S-125 (SA-3 ‘Goa’) have been unveiled by Cuba, writes Grzegorz Holdanowicz. Both were displayed during the celebration of the 45th anniversary of the creation of Communist Cuba’s air force and air defence (Defensa Antiaerea y Fuerza Aerea Revolucionaria – DAAFAR), on 18 April 2006 in the ‘Playa Giron’ Guard Air Brigade (Brigada de Aviacion de la Guardia Playa Giron) at San Antonio de los Banos.
Launchers for both systems have been installed on the chassis of the T-54/55 main battle tank family. Since only the launchers were paraded, it is unclear whether a similar scheme has created mobile versions of the radar and command posts. DAAFAR is thought to have 12-13 battalions of S-75 and S-125 systems.
The mobile launcher of the S-125 system externally resembles the Polish W-125SC launcher of the S-125SC Newa-SC system (see JMR December 2005, p9). However, Polish authorities and companies engaged in development and production of Newa-SC have categorically denied any links with Cuban programme. (“Cuba reveals mobile S-75, S-125 launchers,” Jane’s Missiles and Rockets, 13 June 2006)
Carlo Kopp has already noted differences between the Polish upgrade and what we saw in Cuba. I think we have to seriously consider the possibility that North Korea is handing the upgrade program for Cuba’s air defenses. (Although the North Koreans parade their own S-75 and S-125s on rather more quotidian vehicles.)
2. I also suspect Cuba was paying for upgrade with the sugar, which has a market value on the order of a few million dollars. There are at least two advantages for North Korea in taking barter as payment. Sugar and other goods bartered may not run afoul of the financial restrictions imposed in the sanctions. Moreover, it is politically more difficult for the United States and its allies to seize foodstuffs headed to starving North Korea. And the Cubans were probably delighted to pay in sugar. And the North Koreans can meet the annual candy ration.
3. Finally, the Panamanians say they have invited the UN Panel of Experts to examine the cargo. This is a successful implementation of sanctions, but it is a special case. Panama has a President who likes to pose with interdicted drug shipments, which was the basis for stopping this ship. The fact that it was laden with weapons was just bad luck for the North Koreans and Cubans. Well, luck may or may not have anything to do with it. It was unfortunate for the North Koreans and Cubans at any rate. Sanctions implementation remains still poor for a number of reasons, one of which is that the United States and its allies have not created incentives to make states as eager to enforce sanctions on Iran and North Korea as they might be to interdict drug shipments.
In particular, I draw your attention to the saga of the M/V Monchegorsk, a Russian-owned, Cypriot flagged-ship that the Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines chartered the Monchegorsk to carry a shipment of small arms to Syria in violation of UNSCR 1747.
The US interdicted the shipment at sea in January 2009, forcing it to return to Cyprus. The Cypriots had a real problem — the could not return the goods to Iran or allow them to continue to Syria without drawing the ire of the international community. But Cyprus also faced retaliation from Iran and especially Syria, which responded to a previous interdiction by opening ferry service to the breakaway Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. But the United Nations would not take the arms either. The British and Germans were willing to take the cargo, but the Cypriots were worried about the legality of the seizure. They needed the political cover of a United Nations solutions, as well as technical assistance in handling the dangerous cargo. Ultimately, the cargo sat in Cyprus, stored improperly, for more than two years until it exploded in July 2011 killing a dozen people, including the commander of the Cypriot Navy, and destroying the main power station for the island.
You can pretty much kiss any further Cypriot enforcement of sanctions good-bye now. As I noted following the explosion,”the Security Council, in elaborating on the obligations outlined in UNSCR 1540, [should] enjoin states seizing illicit goods to forfeit their possession to a designated United Nations entity, which in turn would arrange for disposal. There are a variety of options that might work, from supervised destruction under UNMOVIC to a model of delegated disposal under the sanctions committees.”
We have another chance to do this correctly. Let’s not make Panama regret looking beneath those sacks of sugar.
Sean O’Connor has a really great article on Saudi Arabia’s missile force in Jane’s Intelligence Review (“Saudi ballistic missile site revealed“) that nicely updates his 2009 blog post on the same subject. O’Connor’s article offers a nice excuse to tackle what I like to call Saudi Arabia’s “Strategic Dyad.”
Over the past decade, I suspect Saudi Arabia has invested heavily in conventional ballistic and cruise missiles to provide the Kingdom a sort of strategic deterrent. While I don’t think Saudi Arabia is going nuclear in the near future, the acquisition of strategic ballistic and cruise missiles is a pretty interesting development.
1.
Saudi Arabia’s Ballistic Missile Force
O’Connor’s article is interesting, both because of the details it provides about better known and Al Jufayr missile bases, as well as his focus on the much lesser known underground facilities near Rawdah.
Satellite imagery available to IHS Jane’s confirms that there are DF-3 complexes at Al Sulayyil, Al Jufayr, and a previously unseen fa cility at Al Watah. The first public examination of Saudi DF-3 complexes came in 2002, when commercial satellite company Space Imaging’s high-resolution Ikonos satellite provided the first details of the secretive Saudi Arabian IRBM force. Al Sulayyil and Al Jufayr share many similarities, suggesting that they share the same role. Al Jufayr lies approximately 90 km south of Riyadh, with Al Sulayyil approximately 450 km southwest of the capital.
In 1995, lower-resolution imagery from the SPOT satellite, an earth observation imaging system, depicts Al Sulayyil as a significantly less developed complex than the 2002 Ikonos imagery. Comparable historic satellite imagery of Al Jufayr is unavailable. If missiles were operational by 1990, the ongoing development of Al Sulayyil between 1995–2002 suggests that Al Jufayr represented the initial operational location.
…
Satellite imagery analysis of Al Sulayyil and Al Jufayr shows that each has three primary areas. While exact layouts are dictated by a site’s geology, critical components are virtually indistinguishable.
Each complex has two missile garrisons (a north and a south), with a third area providing housing, maintenance, and administrative functions. The garrisons themselves are located a short distance apart within a secured complex. The administrative and support complexes are outside the security perimeter.
…
The Al Watah complex differs in layout from Al Sulayyil and Al Jufayr. Identifiable garrison complexes are not present, with Al Watah instead featuring a large number of UGFs and a co-located series of support structures.
With two Chinese-designed launch pads, Al Watah is connected to Saudi’s IRBM force, but the lack of identifiable garrison facilities and location of the launch pads, bunkers, and support facilities contrasts it with the traditional layouts of Al Sulayyil or Al Jufayr.
2.
Did Saudi Buy the DF-21?
O’Connor works on the assumption that Saudi Arabia continues to operate a force of DF-3 missiles, although he does note that Saudi Arabia might consider purchasing the DF-21 from China in the future. I don’t intend at all to be critical — O’Connor is probably the most careful open source imagery analyst I have ever encountered. I don’t think I’ve ever seen him make a mistake.
That said, it might be worth speculating a bit. Since the early 2000s, rumors have swirled that Saudi Arabia intended to replace the DF-3 missiles purchased in 1987 with something newer, like the solid-fueled DF-21. O’Connor notes, in passing, that ”Although Al Jufayr has been identified as a DF-3 site, the circular launch pads commonly associated with Chinese DF-3 bases are not visible.” That’s interesting. Although the DF-21 has a shorter range than the DF-3, it is still sufficient to reach Tehran, Tel Aviv and a few other choice locations. Or perhaps a Ghauri or Shaheen from Pakistan? Our friend above – the Deputy Defense Minister standing with the Saudi Chief of Staff and the Commander of the Strategic Missile Force– seems to be holding a display case with some interesting missiles.
There is some reason to think that the changes at Saudi missiles bases between 2003-2007 reflect a new missile purchase. In 2000, Bill Gertz leaked a National Air and Space Intelligence Center report — back then it was just the National Air Intelligence Center — report that detailed the sort of changes the intelligence community was tracking at Chinese missiles bases as they converted from handling liquid-fueled DF-3s to solid-fueled DF-21s. (“Nevertheless, recent demolition activity at Datong indicates that facility is also undergoing conversion. Four barracks have been razed since late April, two more are in the process of being razed, and a third may be razed as well.”)
Jonathan Scherck — the former intelligence analyst who self-published a book (Patriot Lost) claiming that Saudi Arabia was going nuclear with the help of China, Pakistan and Dick Cheney (I know, calm down) — described internal debates within the intelligence community about whether changes at the base signaled he arrival of new missiles. Here are the good parts:
Phil, with his many years of experience working in CPD, started things off on our side. In typical Phil fashion, he began to coolly and methodically paint a picture of the DO’s collective view (myopic though it was) of developments relating to Saudi Arabia’s ballistic missile program. He spoke as CIA’s authoritative expert on the matter, which he effectively was at the time …
There had been the vexing shipment in 2003, Phil mentioned first. … The imagery of Chinese shipments arriving in Saudi Arabia since at least 2003, Phil continued, appeared to be related to a considerable overhaul of the Saudis’ ballistic missile capability. This was difficult to argue. However, despite persistent efforts by the DO to target assets for the collection of HUMINT on the issue, Phil concluded, there was just no real progress to report. …
The one thing I distinctly recall mentioning came when the conversation turned to the subject of the dramatic changes that were taking place on the missile bases in conjunction with the shipments, as seen by U.S. satellites: Al Sulayyil, Al Joffer and (of particular interest) the underground storage facility at Rawdah. Obviously, NGA’s bird’s eye view couldn’t reveal what was going on underground at Rawdah, but there was plenty of activity at the mouth of the tunnels leading into the cavernous subterranean bunker to pique everyone’s interest.
[snip]
In this same vein, I was more of the mind that the December 2003 shipment that Charlie Allen helped to delete from the IC’s memory—that this was our best source of information on the ongoing parade of shipments we were witnessing in 2006. Both in terms of what the images themselves reportedly indicated and, just as importantly, the fact that they got boxed away as quickly as they did.
The analysts at NGA never went into great detail about the exact circumstances of Charlie Allen’s intervention, but the general consensus on that shipment years later (corroborated by multiple sources directly familiar with events at the time) was that the imagery from late 2003 indicated that Saudi Arabia had received one or more CSS-5 class ballistic missiles from China.
[snip]
The CSS-5 shipment in December 2003 (the one the Saudi’s supposedly returned to China under observation by U.S. officials watching from a distance with binoculars) had been a clear indication of things to come for Saudi Arabia’s ballistic missile force. This shipment was either the first of many, or perhaps another in a series of such shipments that spanned most of George W. Bush’s presidency—and Dick Cheney’s vice presidency. In either case, there was no arguing the facts—at least as seen from above: Saudi Arabia was acquiring a new and far different ballistic missile capability.
Even after December 2003, NGA would continue to disseminate plenty more imagery analysis, right up to the time of my departure in April 2007 in fact. These subsequent write-ups all pointed to a new system, one with characteristics quite consistent with the CSS-5. In addition, several key Saudi missile bases were undergoing significant overhaul during this time; changes that (by all appearances) were consistent with the arrival of a new class of ballistic missile. Large launch pads at the bases, which had been used for years by the Saudi SRF as part of their CSS-2 launch training, went into disrepair or were reused for entirely different purposes.
One particular report out of NGA described a massive shipment of what analysts concluded with a high degree of certainty were “TELs” (transporter erector launchers), the tractor trailer launch vehicles described above. These TELs looked very similar to the Chinese CSS-5 transport vehicles one finds in Jane’s military encyclopedia, although—to be fair—“looked like” should not be confused with a one-for-one match. As much as Hollywood likes to portray U.S. satellite capabilities as being able to provide the numbers of a car’s license plate parked in downtown Moscow, this was not the same level of fidelity that NGA analysts were working with over Saudi. Nevertheless, this particular shipment had clearly been a substantial delivery of missile transport vehicles. That much was clear.
And yet, oddly, NGA’s published analysis of the event failed to reference the CSS-5 by name. But the Chinese make and model was clearly there, in between the lines. And if you bothered to ask the analysts at NGA who had actually written the report what they thought was going on (indeed, what they wanted to write), they were more than happy to explain.
Now, one can raise a number of questions about the logic in Scherck’s book — particularly when he starts imagining Pakistani warheads on those Chinese missiles or accusing Bush Administration officials of various crimes — but when Scherck sticks to the details about monitoring foreign missile shipments and deployments, he’s believable. It is in this context, that I interpret the post-2003 changes that O’Connor detailed at Al Jufayr and the scope of the facility near Rawdah. (Sadly, we don’t seem to have satellite images of Al Sulayyil before 2003.)
On the other hand, the most recent Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat lists Saudi Arabia as having only DF-3 ballistic missiles. There are two explanations for this. First, Scherck claims that the intelligence community could not confirm the sale. He chalks this up to a deliberate policy of misdirection by the Bush Administration, although I think it is more likely that Saudi Arabia is a hard target. What if we aren’t sure whether Saudi bought Chinese, Pakistani or both? Second, NASIC does seem to censor itself regarding Saudi missile purchases. Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat also omits Saudi Arabia’s purchase of Storm Shadow cruise missiles from the UK, even though this sale is relatively well documented.
3.
Storm Shadow
I would be remiss if I did not add that, in addition to a force of ballistic missiles, Saudi Arabia also appears to have purchased some number of Strom Shadow cruise missiles from the United Kingdom, a transaction that has been much discussed in this space. (See: Storm Shadow, Saudi & the MTCR, 31 May 2011; More Saudi/Storm Shadow/MTCR, 7 June 2011; and Saudi Storm Shadow Sale Confirmed, 3 April 2012.)
Saudi Arabia’s Strategic Dyad
So, the US has been mum on both purchases. I am confident the Storm Shadow sale occurred. I suspect Saudi Arabia may also have purchased the DF-21 or something very similar. If true, Saudi Arabia has acquired a capable strategic dyad of conventionally-armed ballistic and cruise missiles. With nary a peep from the US.
It is worth asking why Saudi Arabia is purchasing such a fancy conventional deterrent. We have a surprisingly detailed account of Saudi Arabia’s purchase of the missiles from Khaled bin Sultan, the senior Saudi commander during the 1991 Gulf War. Khaled wrote a book entitled Desert Warrior that includes an entire chapter on the purchase, as well as a discussion of the decision not to use the missiles following Scud attacks by Iraq against Saudi Arabia in 1991. After Iraq fired Scuds at Saudi Arabia in 1991, Khaled claimed the Saudi’s found that the DF-3 missiles were simply too inaccurate to use for retaliation, fearing civilian casualties in Iraq:
Not surprisingly, these attacks prompted us to think of retaliation. We made ready our Strategic Missile Force under Brigadier General Ibrahim al-Dakhil, a well-disciplined, hard-working officer who had been my deputy, and targeted our weapons on major Iraqi cities. If ever there was right moment to unleash our Chinese-built surface-to-surface missiles, this seemed to be it. We felt we needed to hit back in self-defense so as to deter further Iraqi Scud attacks. According, I gave orders to assemble in the right locations all the various elements of our missiles — save for the liquid fuel, which is pumped in at the very last stage, following which a launch cannot be reversed. I then waited for Prince Sultan to transmit to me the King’s order to fire. But, after some anxious hours, King Fahd decided not to escalate the conflict. He made a rational decision to reserve the missiles as a weapon of last resort, thereby demonstrating the Kingdom’s sense of responsibility. He did not want to cause casualties among innocent Iraqi civilians and he no doubt judged that the Coalition’s air campaign being waged against Iraq was sufficient retaliation.
No doubt American attitudes played a role too, but it is hard not to read the phrase: “If ever there was right moment to unleash our Chinese-built surface-to-surface missiles, this seemed to be it.” If the accuracy of the DF-3 created political barrier to its use, perhaps Storm Shadow cruise missiles or new ballistic missiles might be more usable if push comes to shove.
I totally recommend Desert Warrior, by the way. General Khaled tells some very funny stories, particularly regarding how a security breach resulted in Al Sulayyil hiring one very well paid Imam.
The CTBTO is going to live-stream a policy course entitled Proven Treaty, Political Challenge: The CTBT and Multistakeholder Security, with a pretty high quality list of speakers. And, if you are in Vienna, the course is free of charge.
The CTBT Diplomacy and Public Policy Course, entitled, “Proven Treaty, Political Challenge: The CTBT and Multistakeholder Security”, will be held from 15 to 19 July 2013 in Vienna and live streamed online.
Special guest lecturers will include:
• Professor Siegfried Hecker, Director Emeritus, Los Alamos National Laboratory and Senior Fellow and Professor, Stanford University; Visiting Distinguished Scientist, Vienna Center for Disarmament and Non-proliferation
• Ambassador Jayantha Dhanapala, President, Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs; President of the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference; former UN Undersecretary General for Disarmament Affairs
• Ambassador Sha Zukang, Chinese lead negotiator at negotiations for the CTBT
• Ambassador Arundhati Ghose, Indian lead negotiator at negotiations for the CTBT
• Ambassador Jaap Ramaker, Netherlands, Chairperson at negotiations for the CTBT
• Dr James Acton, Senior Associate, Nuclear Policy Program, Carnegie Endowment
• Dr Pierce Corden, Visiting Scholar, American Association for the Advancement of Science
• Mark Fitzpatrick, Director, Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Programme, International Institute for Strategic Studies
• Dr Bruce Goodwin, Associate Director-at-Large, National Security Policy & Research and Director, Center for Global Security Research, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
• Dr Rebecca Johnson, Executive Director, Acronym Institute
• Jenifer Mackby, Adjunct Fellow and Consultant, International Security Program, Center for Strategic and International Studies
• Andreas Persbo, Executive Director, VERTIC
• Dr Daniel Pinkston, Deputy Project Director, North East Asia Project, International Crisis Group
• Dr Maria Sultan, Director General, South Asian Strategic Stability Institute
• Dr William Potter, Director, James Martin Center for Non-proliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International StudiesThe course will cover political and diplomatic aspects of the CTBT, its history and current challenges and prospects for its entry-into-force and universalization. Participants will cover the basics of the Treaty and its verification regime through a series of e-learning modules to be completed prior to 15 July, which will then be followed by a live lecture component from 15 to 19 July in Vienna.
The live lecture component will feature CTBTO expert staff, guest lectures and panel discussions, as well as an interactive simulation.
Participants can take part in the course in Vienna or follow online, by watching the live stream or archived videos. Participants who complete all of the course requirements will receive a certificate of successful completion. The course is free-of-charge and open to all interested parties. Registration and further information are available here.The course is part of the CTBTO’s education and outreach activities, aimed at inspiring the next generation of experts in all aspects of the Treaty.Inquiries on the logistics of the course can be sent to cdi@ctbto.org
Also, it’s a nice excuse to give a ‘tsup? to Christian Rengifo. That’s him, asking a question last year.
Sonni Efron has an article online at the TheAtlantic.com detailing the efforts of a Syrian activist to crowd-source missile launches [link fixed] against civilians in Aleppo and other opposition-held areas:
[Dishad] Othman’s SCUD early warning system began operating on Wednesday. It is called Aymta, which means “when” in Arabic. Users can opt to receive alerts by phone, text message, SMS, e-mail or RSS feed, or, if the regime cuts off internet access, as it often does, via a broadcast on satellite television or radio frequencies outside of regime control. Within the first 24 hours, 16,000 people viewed his website and 87 had registered to receive his alerts – although up to 40 percent of Syria was reportedly experiencing power outages at the time. Two satellite television stations also signed up for alerts. Some Syrians have already registered from abroad to track impending attacks on their hometowns and alert their families.
Reactions posted on Othman’s social media pages range from joy to disbelief.
“Thank God,” typed one fan over and over.
“The idea is great but this is a luxury,” wrote another from Aleppo. “Most people here in Syria do not have communications or sometimes power and will never get these warnings.”
Othman believes that forces loyal to President Bashir al-Assad have not fired a SCUD at civilians since a June 20 SCUD-D was fired at Aleppo at 11:45 p.m. from al Qalamon in the Damascus countryside. But when the next SCUD goes up, Othman is confident that his text messages will reach some people before the missile.
[snip]
In Syria, most of the casualties from missile attacks are caused by buildings collapsing onto people. Othman says merely instructing people to run out into the street or into a basement would increase the odds of survival. SCUDs are among the slowest of missiles, and in theory, a few minutes’ warning should be enough, especially if activists in the target zones rig up local public address systems to sound air raid sirens when Aymta sends a warning.
Since I am listed as having “advised” Othman, I think a blog post is in order.
I met Othman through Efron, who is a former journalist, State Department official and now a fellow at Human Rights First. I’ve made a few suggestions here and there, but Aymta is Othman’s brain-child. If it helps, he and his colleagues deserve the credit for establishing the system. I’ve purposely remained ignorant of all the details beyond the basic facts outlined in the article. (Although I am obviously really interested in Syria’s Scud force.)
I think the Aymta warning system is potentially valuable for at least two reasons. First, early warning of incoming missile attacks can save lives if people leave their buildings. Even very imperfect warning may be valuable. Once a Scud slams into a neighborhood, residents will want to know if more missiles are incoming or if it is safe to go back inside. Second, Syria is launching missile attacks to terrorize civilians. There is value to doing something, even if that something is imperfect, to counteract feelings of helplessness. If the missile attacks are intended to demoralize Syrian civilians by making them feel vulnerable and powerless, Aymta serves as a reminder of the power of collective action in the face of a threat.
Then there is the third reason — to encourage the US government to provide missile warning information to Syrian civilians. One of my complaints about the debate over “arming” Syrian opposition forces relates to the fact that the US was providing substantial humanitarian and nonlethal assistance to the Syrian opposition even before recent rumblings about providing arms of one sort or another. There is a real conversation about the benefits of simply making good on past promises and whether the US might expand the types of help available within the “non-lethal” category. Providing missile warning to Syrian civilians seems like an obvious step. In 1991, the United States provided warning of Scud attacks to Israel and Saudi Arabia during Operation Desert Storm. A discussion of the technical issues with providing this data is beyond the scope of this blog post, but suffice it to say: I think the very smart people in the US military can find a way to get a few minutes of warnings to civilians if our political leadership asks them.
Reader Chris Camp, who comments under the name Cthippo, sent me an essay last week that I wanted to share with readers. Camp asks which states would be winners (or losers) if some sorcerer used a magic wand make all the world’s nuclear weapons disappear.
As I read through and found myself agreeing here, disagreeing there, I realized that I was having fun and thinking about an old problem in new way. The essay is deceptive in its simplicity.
Really, try it.
After Global Zero,
Winners and losers in a post-nuclear worldWhat if we woke up tomorrow and there were no more nuclear weapons? What if, overnight, they had ceased to exist, and no nation could ever build one again. What if the genie decided to crawl back in its bottle?
While it’s easy to say the world would be a safer place, not every state that had formerly possed a nuclear arsenal would feel this way. Some would certainly feel more secure, but others would very likely feel far more vulnerable.
It’s easy to say that we favor global zero, and to encourage everyone else to get on board, but without understanding the role that nuclear weapons play in the perception of security of each nation it becomes difficult to make an argument as to why they should give them up. By looking at how each nuclear weapons state might perceive a world without nuclear weapons we can gain some insight into the role that these weapons play in their security and perhaps identify the concerns that need to be addressed before those who have the bomb might be willing to give it up.
United States – Winner
The United States sees its nuclear arsenal as an expensive tool of limited utility mostly to deter Russia and to a much lesser extent other nuclear states and also states posessing chemical and biological weapons. These lesser considerations can be countered by the US military’s conventional power which far outstrips that of any other nation, and is compounded by the country’s geographical isolation from hostile states.
Outside of a massive nuclear exchange with Russia, America does not percieve itself to be the subject of any real existential threat, and so if the Russian threat were to evaporate then with it would go the utility of the American arsenal.
Russia – Loser
The counterpoint to the American perception of nuclear weapons is Russia, which sees itself as very weak conventionally and surrounded by real or potential enemies. The collapse of the Russian economy coupled with ongoing systemic reforms withing their military and the loss of the Warsaw Pact “buffer zone” between Russia and those who might seek to invade it has left the Russian government feeling that nuclear weapons are their only remaining effective defense against hostile forces. In addition, the possession of the largest nuclear arsenal in the world gives Russia a political relevance and a parity with the United States disproportionate to its economic power and regional influence. If that defense were to suddenly evaporate then Russia would truly feel up the proverbial creek without a paddle.
China – Winner
China maintains a small nuclear arsenal to deter the arsenals of Russia and the United States, and probably to some extent to threaten Taiwan. This small arsenal is backed up by a massive conventional force, and a strong economy to support it, which guarentees China’s conventional security. If the nuclear threat were to disappear then it’s doubtful if China would miss their own arsenal.
United Kingdom – Winner
The UK developed its nuclear arsenal with two goals in mind, independent deterrence against Russia and to prop up its great power status in a post-colonial world. With the end of the Soviet Union and the political changes since the cold war, both of these drivers have lost relevance and yet the nation continues to spend billions on an arsenal that they don’t feel that they need, but are politically unable to get rid of. If that arsenal were to disappear overnight the British government would likely breath a sigh of relief and move on with life.
France – Winner
The origins of the French arsenal are very similar to those of the British, but perhaps more strongly held given their experiences in two world wars. The independent deterrent has played a greater role in the French perception of itself as a sovereign nation than it has for the British, especially since that deterrent was developed domestically. None the less, the French reaction to sudden global zero would likely be the same as the British, if perhaps a little less heartfelt.
India – Winner
India developed nuclear weapons to deter China, and also to burnish their image as in independent regional power in a bipolar cold war era. Since then, the threat from China has diminished significantly, and the ongoing move from bipolar to multipolar geopolitics has increased India’s perception of its security and place in the world. The counter point to that improving security situation is the emergence of Pakistan as a nuclear weapons state in direct opposition to India. Currently India continues to see its arsenal as a deterrent to China and Pakistan and as a point of national pride, though the latter role is probably greatly diminished after almost 40 years. Currently, the Indian arsenal is usually discussed in the context of a Pakistani nuclear threat and so if that threat were to disappear then India would likely continue to feel quite secure.
Pakistan – Loser
Pakistan developed its nuclear arsenal in response to the Indian development of such weapons and continues to see them as primarily a deterrent against Indian strength, both conventional and nuclear. A secondary motivation is that Pakistan receives much recognition as the home of the “Islamic bomb” and has an outsized relevance on the world stage due to its status as a NWS. Unfortunately for Pakistan’s perception of its own security, its arsenal is the only guarantor of this status. Were it to lose nuclear deterrence they would feel themselves under much greater threat without the conventional or economic might to counter Indian or other foreign aggression.
Israel – Loser, sort of
The question of the Israeli nuclear arsenal in a global zero world is probably the most complicated. When the program began Israel faced probably the greatest existential threat of any nation on earth, and also sought an independent deterrence against the Soviet Union. In addition to the deterrent role, these weapons were also intended as retribution weapons in the event that deterrence failed, something not often spoken about in the nuclear doctrine of other nations. However, since those days the world and regional situation has changed dramatically and Israel’s security has been the big winner. Currently the nation does not face a credible existential threat and so it would seem like they should be a winner in a weapons free world.
On the other hand, due to its history both as a nation and as a a people, the “siege mentality” is somewhat built into Israeli politics and security perceptions and so while they in fact would not be less secure without a nuclear deterrent, it seems likely that they would feel significantly less secure.
North Korea – Loser
North Korea is another case where perceptions of security and relevance cloud the issue. On the one hand the massive North Korean conventional military capability provides excellent national security, but their tiny nuclear arsenal contributes little to that security while greatly increasing their international relevance. Were that arsenal to disappear overnight it seems unlikely that North Korea’s security would be diminished in a real sense, but their perception of their security would be greatly diminished. In addition, without nuclear weapons nobody would be talking much about North Korea, much less talking to them.
Summary – What makes winners and losers, and why it matters
The difference between winners and losers in a global zero world is the role that nuclear weapons play in their national security, both real and perceived. The winners are states who see nuclear weapons as having a limited utility in countering other nuclear weapons states and who’s national security is supported by both economic and conventional military power. The losers are states for whom the utility of their arsenals is asymmetric, who depend on nuclear weapons to deter not only other nations nuclear weapons, but also their conventional forces.
A further complicating factor is one of international relevance and prestige. The more that a nation is dependent on their nuclear arsenal for relevance, regardless of their actual security situation, the less likely they are to give up those arsenals.
While this is a theoretical exercise, the practical application comes in understanding the motivations of nations when negotiating arms control issues. When asking a sovereign nation to reduce or abolish its nuclear arsenal, it’s important to understand what role that arsenal plays in their perception of their own security and relevance on the world stage. If we are going to ask them to give up a piece of their security, what can we offer them in return that might improve their security, real or perceived?
Without further ado, a guest post by R. Scott Kemp, assistant professor of nuclear science and engineering at MIT, where he directs the Laboratory for Nuclear Security and Policy.
When it comes to North Korea, there are pretty severe limits on traditional intelligence-gathering. Spy agencies frequently disagree about what’s happening in the country, and rarely can they ever say anything conclusive. North Korea is simply too closed and too disconnected to go snooping around in the usual manner.
But then, sometimes, they just stick what you need in the newspaper.
Kim Jong-un has finally started to visit factories across the country in the tradition of his father and grandfather. In a visit to the Kanggye General Tractor Plant publicized over the weekend, we see him looking at a big machine, but not just any machine. It’s a specialized flow-forming machine of the type used to make centrifuge rotors. Could this actually be a secret centrifuge-manufacturing capability?
Flow-forming machines are pretty rare. There are only a handful of flow-forming companies in the United States, and the coveted machines were among the hard-to-get items traded during the early days of the Khan network. These machines are the only way to manufacture the thin-walled P-2 centrifuge rotor on which the North Korean enrichment program is thought to be built. While flow-forming is used outside of centrifuge manufacturing plants, the applications are limited and only a small handful of applications require the Computer Numerically Controlled (CNC) machine shown above.
(Going by its name, the plant manufactures tractors, and while flow-forming is occasionally used in the automotive industry to make fancy aluminum-alloy rims, it seems unlikely that North Korean farmers are in the habit of outfitting their tractors with 40-inch bling and ranging around Gangnam style.)
And do you see that curved ceiling? Looks like this tractor factory is in an underground tunnel. Hmm…
Elsewhere in the factory, we see this hot piercer mill, a machine that takes raw feedstock and makes the thick-walled seamless tubes that serve as preforms for the flow-forming machines. The dimension of that preform looks pretty close to the dimensions of a P-2 centrifuge rotor.
Much about the facility speaks to its special importance within the industrial hierarchy. This “tractor plant” is located in an isolated area of the country, Jagang Province, about which the outside world seems to know little. Despite their isolation, the local employees have been blessed with recreational facilities far in excess of what the government provides to the average working stiff—like this enormous recreational facility, planted gardens, and a large swimming pool with deck chairs. Life is often best for those that are part of the strategic weapons complex.
To top it off, we find this nice poster on the wall. The resolution is too poor to make out anything with high confidence, but it appears to show objects that look far more like centrifuge rotors than tractors.
I don’t know Korean, but maybe somebody who does can figure out what those posters say. Update. Apparently, the rubric says, “2000t – 400t press process diagram,” indicating that the poster is not centrifuge-related.
The propaganda surrounding this visit also suggests the importance of the facility. According to North Korea-watchers, this appearance is part of the first large wave of publicized visits KJU has made to locations far from the capital city since assuming power—an early and choice destination. The other stops on the tour were machine-tool factories, in particular a precision-machine tool plant that was distinguished by having been awarded the order of Kim Il-song. (See: “Kim Jong Un Provides Field Guidance to Jangjagang Machine Tool Plant,” KCNA, 23 June 2013.) Earlier visits in the current wave included trips to factories with high-precision CNC machines also in what appear to be underground tunnels; these are candidates for making the smaller components of the rotor.
According to North Korea-watchers, previous Kim Jong-un visits outside of Pyongyang as Supreme Commander were almost exclusively to military bases. The present campaign of publicized leadership site visits appears designed to underscore North Korea’s recently adopted “new line” of ideology, in which the economy will be improved at the same time that nuclear weapons are developed. In early April, North Korea announced that it is “readjusting and restarting” its nuclear facilities at Yongbyon, including a gas centifuge enrichment plant, on these grounds.
This is not the first flow-forming machine to be seen in North Korea. Television coverage of a September 2006 leadership visit showed the now-deceased Kim Jong-il inspecting a more primitive flow-forming machine at the Kusong Machine Tool factory, which manufactures machine tools.
That machine looked more like an early prototype; it appears to lack fancy CNC controls. Later, in 2011, five North Korean researchers were awarded a patent for a CNC Control System for an unspecified metalworking machine. The patent award (Ri Yong-chol, Kim Myong-chol, Kim Chi-yong, Kim Kwang-su, and Ri Chol-ung, “CNC Control System of Metal-Working Machine,” Palmyong Kangbo [Pyongyang], 5 October 2011) is short and vague in its description, but it contains keywords that suggest it is for a flow-forming machine.
The latest flow-forming machine at the “tractor factory” appears to be state-of-the-art. When combined with photos showing raw steel billets and the piercer mills, it appears to be part of an assembly-line fabrication process for making thin-walled components. And all of it appears to have been located safely underground. If this facility is making centrifuge rotors, then it appears to be starting from raw feedstock, which incidentally connects nicely with another technical analyses, yet to be published, suggesting that the DPRK is capable of making its own maraging steel from indigenous resources. (Sorry, you’ll have to wait for that one!)
Even if this “tractor factory” is not where P-2 rotors are fabricated, it would still be remarkable for showing that North Korea possesses many of the key technologies needed. Combined with the absence of reports of rotor-related procurements since about 2002 and the full-scale program shown to Sig Hecker in 2010, it appears that North Korea is, at a minimum, well on its way to freeing the centrifuge program from dependence on foreign supplies and technology. Indeed, in the last ten years we have seen almost no reports of centrifuge-related procurements at all, just a few machine tools with possible application in the program and the purchase of UF6-compatible oil.
The traditional modes of watching and intercepting foreign procurements, refined in the era of A.Q. Khan, seem to be inadequate when it comes to North Korea. Yet the DPRK has a record of facilitating the nuclear-weapon programs of other countries and makes a business of selling advanced military technologies around the world. For these reasons, North Korea is arguably the most serious proliferation threat today. The apparent intelligence gap about what’s going on with the North Korean centrifuge program does not bring confidence that we will know what is coming down the pike, or how to respond. Yet it is amazing what can be done with open-source information and the dying art of propaganda analysis. If we want to get North Korea right, it might be prudent to shore up the area of open-source analysis, even if it’s not nearly as sexy as traditional intelligence work.
Sorry about not blogging for the past few weeks. I haven’t submitted a Foreign Policy column, either. As some of you may know, things have been pretty tough on both personal and professional fronts for a while now. Am modestly optimistic that things will start sucking less over the next few weeks.
Anyway, this little story cheered me up.
A couple of weeks back, I posted a little essay at Foreign Policy on the whole threat inflation industry related to the threat of an electromagnetic pulse attack (The EMPire Strikes Back, 23 May 2013). Although the physical phenomenon of electromagnetic pulse is real, I argued, the severity of an attack is often presented in nearly apocalyptic terms that are simply not supported by the available data.
The commenters broke out the tinfoil hats! My favorite was one Vance Frickey. He was not very nice in the comments, arguing (among other things) that I had no idea what I was talking about because he saw an episode of Future Weapons in which an EMP simulator killed a car:
The host of the TV series FutureWeapons dramatically demonstrated how vulnerable modern automobiles are to EMP by driving a late-model American sedan near the Kirtland Air Force Base TRESTLE EMP simulator when it generated an EMP – the pulse was silent, unheralded by sparks, glow or anything – but the immediate loss of power in the car, which drifted to a stop and could not be restarted. The Kirtland TRESTLE is the standard simulator for nuclear EMP effects for the US Air Force; it can be regarded as a faithful simulation of nuclear EMP. Now, imagine most of the cars and trucks in Canada and the United States drifting to a stop in mid-traffic. That would, of course, include most emergency response vehicles in both countries, everything but military vehicles – which we hope are EMP-hardened. With no police response, no EMTs available to go to the scene of innumerable accidents, no tow trucks to clear wrecks, North America’s roads would be chaos.
You can imagine where this is going, right? Frickey accuses me of “ignorance, prejudice and crass stupidity.” Let’s have a little referendum on that, shall we?
Hey, I am not made of stone.
It was pretty easy to find the episode of Future Weapons in question. Future Weapons ran from 2006-2008 on the Discovery Channel. It was hosted by Richard “Mack” Machowicz, who now hosts a conservative talk radio show in Houston.
Watch Future weapons EMP in Technology | View More Free Videos Online at Veoh.com
Sure enough, “Mack” does appear to drive a car through an EMP simulator. It glides to a stop and he can’t restart it. He really hams it up, by way. To my wife and children, I love you.
My reaction was pretty simple: “Bullshit.”
There were a few reasons for skepticism.
First, I know the relevant statistics for EMP effects on automobiles – when the EMP commission performed the same stunt, only 3 of the 37 automobiles died – and all three restarted. (One of 18 trucks did need a tow.) Just based on that sample alone, it would seem very unlikely that the Future Wars producers struck paydirt with a single EMP simulation that killed their rental. Then there is the awkward fact that the electronic windows and dash displays still worked.
Second, the United States military is one of the most risk–averse, safety conscious organizations I have ever encountered. I was prepared to wager that White Sands Missile Range takes safety very, very seriously. No way they let anyone — let alone some meathead television host — drive a car through an EMP simulator when it’s active. If you read the EMP Commission report very, very carefully it says the cars that stalled would glide to a stop, not that the cars that stalled did.
Finally – and perhaps most important – virtually everything on television is fake. Ancient Aliens, The Real World, Snooki, its just entertainment. In particular, the Discovery Channel has previously had problems with staging scenes and not mentioning that fact to gullible viewers. Gullible viewers like Vance Frickey. Television producers simply don’t care about providing factual content to couch potatoes. If something on television seems too good to be true – it’s too good to be true.
So, my working assumption was that this episode of this television show was one giant, steaming pile of BS.
Turns out I was right.
Future Wars identified the location as White Sands Missile Range. It wasn’t too hard to figure out that the simulator in question was the Horizontally Polarized Dipole II Simulator. (Not the Trestle or ATLAS-1 at Kirtland as Frickey claimed. You can’t possibly confuse them. The TRESTLE was huge and is no longer active.)
I asked Catherine Dill, our super R.A., to just call White Sands Missile Range to ask whether they really let this guy drive a car through the simulator. Their answer was NO. The press folks at White Sands Missile Range were really very helpful and professional. They took our request to someone who works on the HPD II simulator and asked the expert. Here are Catherine’s notes from her conversation:
Although the 2007 episode of Future Weapons appears to show an individual driving a vehicle through the Horizontally Polarized Dipole II Simulator at the White Sands Missile Range EMP facility during an active EMP simulation, the shot in fact was staged.
There was no one inside the vehicle. WSMR EMP experts confirmed to the official that individuals are not allowed to be exposed to the EMP simulator while it is active. WSMR apologizes that the show represented the shot as such.
Additionally, the official explained that because ordinary fuel is flammable, vehicles cannot go through the simulator without first mixing an additive to the fuel (usually argon), which was not possible for the vehicle used during filming.
This is great. The shot in fact was staged. There was no one inside the vehicle. Individuals are not allowed to be exposed to the EMP simulator. Vehicles cannot go through the simulator without mixing an additive to the fuel which was not possible for the vehicle used during filming. WSMR apologizes …
I love, by the way, that the folks at White Sands feel the need to apologize. As far as I can tell, no one at White Sands did anything remotely wrong. They simply showed their admittedly awesome EMP simulator to an unscrupulous television team. The WSMR people seem taken advantage of, if you ask me.
So, to recap.
They guy claims he drove the car through the simulator. He’s lying.
He also claimed the gasoline tank was filled with a special additive. Again, he’s lying.
He claimed the car wouldn’t start up. He seems to be lying about that too, since they couldn’t mix the additive to the fuel to put it through the simulator.
The shot was staged.
The other day, I posted an entry at 38North outlining three scenarios for North Korea — that North Korea would eventually test a Musudan, that China has stayed Kim Jong Un’s hand for the moment and that North Korean politics have aligned against a test.
Two readers — Markus Schiller and Anon O’Moose — wrote in to observe that the piece would have been stronger had I considered a fourth scenario: what if the Musudan is not real at all?
I happent to think the Musudan is real for reasons I will explain, but I admit the piece would have been stronger had I considered the alternative possibility. Consider this compensation for that oversight.
Markus Schiller has agues in his monograph, Characterizing the North Korean Missile Threat, that North Korea probably does not have any operational intermediate range-ballistic missiles based on the SS-N-6. Markus believes that the North Korean may never have tested an indigenously manufactured missile:
The best-supported hypothesis (i.e., the one with the lowest inconsistency score) is the “Bluff” hypothesis. According to this hypothesis, in its testing, North Korea has launched Soviet/Russian-made missiles (that are proven but old designs) to maximize the appearance of performance, but may never have tested missiles from its own production—any such indigenous missiles cannot have noteworthy reliability or accuracy
As a result, North Korea according to Markus is unlikely to have any operational SS-N-6 missiles.
Even if rumors of transfers of longer-range SS-N-6 missiles in the 1990s are true, these SS-N-6 missiles would have far outrun their service life and are likely not operational anymore. (Contrary to other Soviet missiles, SS-N-6 missiles were fueled in the factory and sealed, resulting in limited service life.)
In the scenario based on the “bluff” hypothesis, North Korea takes the display mockups from the parade, then deploys them to the coast with real Scuds, then enjoys watching us freak out about it before eventually putting them away. Since “the main purpose of the North Korean missile program is … to gain strategic leverage in foreign politics,” the deployment was a ruse.
He’s right — even if I don’t think the scenario is terribly likely — the article would be stronger for considering the possibility. (My entry on the subject is here; Markus added his views in the comments.) Many of my colleagues agree with Markus.
On the other hand, the US intelligence community appears to believe that North Korea can produce Scud and Nodong missiles and that the Musudan is real. The 2009 Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat, 2010 Ballistic Missile Defense Review and 2013 Report to Congress on Military and Security Developments Involving the DPRK all express the view the the DPRK’s missile program, including the Musudan, is real – as does a leaked 2009 cable containing a paper the US distributed to other MTCR states.
I”ll be the first person to suggest we ought to scrutinize IC assessments based on open source information. In general, my approach is to try to understand the judgements of the US intelligence community, the basis for these judgements and any areas of disagreement. Absent some compelling information in my possession, I will default to those judgements.
In this case, I just don’t think the available information is conclusive enough to reject the view of the IC that the DPRK missile program is real. In particular, I am mindful of the fact that the US intelligence community has had the opportunity to examine Scuds sourced to both the Soviet Union and North Korea, with the latter coming from Libya and probably the UAE. DIAC has a Scud in the rotunda, for Pete’s sake. They should know what these things look like. More seriously, the Missile Defense Agency has conducted intercept tests against “foreign military assets” — anywhere from Scuds to components like foreign reentry vehicles. GAO even include a picture in their list of targets (third from the left.)
And then there are the many components, materials and production equipment intercepted on DPRK ships. It would seem to be straightforward enough to assess whether these items represented a North Korean missile program or Soviet overstock. The fact the IC continues to conclude the missiles are of North Korean origin is persuasive enough for me.
I am mindful, as Markus will no doubt point out, that some of the items we see in Iran or have seized do bear Cyrillic markings. So, obviously there is prima facie evidence to take his view seriously and respectfully. I just don’t find it sufficient. Interesting, though. Very interesting.
I’ll leave you with some passages from that cable distributed to MTCR states:
North Korea’s ballistic missile program started in the 1980s, when it reverse-engineered Soviet-made 300 km-range Scud B SRBMs acquired from Egypt. In return for these systems, North Korea assisted Egypt’s efforts to domestically produce Scuds. Building on this success, Pyongyang began designing the 500 km-range Scud C in the mid-1980s. These Scuds have been exported to customers in the Middle East and are deployed in North Korea. Given their 20 years experience working with Scud technology, North Korea is able to design and produce extended-range variants of the Scud, capable of delivering payloads of over 500 kg to ranges up to 1,000 km.
[snip]
Recently, North Korea has developed a new land- mobile intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) derived from the Soviet SS-N-6 (‘Serb’//R-27/4K10) submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM), which was designed by the Soviet Union’s Makeyev Design Bureau in the 1960s. This technology represents a substantial advance in North Korea’s liquid propellant technology, as the SS-N-6 had a much more advanced engine and used more energetic propellants-unsymmetrical dimethylhydrazine (UDMH) and nitrogen tetroxide (N2O4)- than those used in Scud-type missiles. The new IRBM is a single-stage missile and may have a range of up to 4,000 km with a 500 kg payload. Moreover, development of the new IRBM is even more disturbing since this more advanced propulsion technology allows North Korea to build even longer-range missiles-or shorter range missiles with greater payload capacity-than would be possible using Scud-type technology
[snip]
North Korea has developed most of the necessary capability and infrastructure to produce and assemble its ballistic missiles indigenously. Its deployed forces include hundreds of Scud and No Dong missiles, and we expect the new IRBM and Toksa to be fielded in the coming years.
[snip]
Pyongyang continues to sell ballistic missile- related technology to countries in the Middle East, while seeking to re-engage with former customers in the region. It also is likely pursuing new markets for its missiles, including in regions such as Southeast Asia and Africa. North Korea offers a wide-range of ballistic missile services. North Korea almost certainly is willing to offer any missile design in its inventory for sale to customers interested in complete systems, and can design missiles to meet specific customer needs. For customers with established missile programs or otherwise lacking interest in complete systems, North Korea provides missile refurbishment and technical expertise, ground support equipment and launchers, and production technology. North Korea can also broker precision machine tools and other missile- related raw materials for customers through Pyongyang’s extensive procurement network.
I have a new column up at Foreign Policy (“Death Wears Bunny Slippers”) considering this recent story at the Air Force has suspended 17 ICBM launch officers are Minot Air Force Base and initiated proceedings against another.
The column is largely an act of media criticism. After several Air Force mishaps relating to the handling of nuclear weapons systems came to light in 2007 and 2008, many of us began to argue that declining competence in the nuclear field was the inevitable result of the declining mission for nuclear-armed ICBMs and bombers.
What is interesting about the AP story about the disciplinary actions at Minot is that it represents an attempt to reframe that argument, blaming Global Zero and other arms control efforts for the loss of focus. As I note in the piece, the timeline of mishaps and disarmament talk simply doesn’t support such an inference. The increase in disarmament talk is, like the increase in mishaps, the effect of the declining utility of these systems.
Having said that, I wanted to explore the relationship between readiness and reporting in a way that I couldn’t fit in the column.
On one hand, the poor performance of the unit does seem to be an example of the sort of problems identified in the Raaberg, Peyer, Donald, Schlesinger and Welch reports. The Deputy Commander of the 91OG called it “rot” — a metaphor that conveys a systemic problem.
On the other hand, this case is different for the others in an important way. The incidents in 2006 and 2007 each came light in a manner that reflected poorly on the Air Force. The Air Force did not discover the mistaken 2006 transfer of Minuteman III components until 2008! One might say the Air Force stumbled on to both incidents.
In this case, however, the disciplinary action against the personnel at Minot arose from tougher inspection procedures created in response to past failures. In 2009 — the first year of the tougher inspections — the Air Force handed out 3 “unsatisfactory” grades on Operational Readiness Inspections. The Air Force had only given four such grades in the preceding decade. The three unsatisfactory grades did not represent a sudden one-year decline in operational readiness; they are a statistical artifact of different (and tougher) reporting requirements.
There is truth to the Air Force’s defense that tougher inspections mean more units will receive lower scores, but this should result in higher readiness overall.
SEC. DONLEY: Mr. Chairman, let me assure you that I am confident in the Air Force’s ability to maintain a safe and secure nuclear deterrent. The circumstances that you referred to some years ago are very much personally known to me, as it was the proximate cause for my arrival in the Air Force in 2008. [Donley is referring to Secretary Gates's decision to fire the Secretary of the Air Force and the Air Force Chief of Staff in response to two nuclear weapons-related mishaps. Ed.] And we have made substantial progress in restoring the confidence, I think, of our entire DOD and congressional leadership in the Air Force’s management of this important responsibility. It is a number one responsibility for our Air Force that we take very, very seriously.
As part of the changes made after this period that you referred to earlier in the 2008 and ’09 period, we substantially strengthened the inspection process. And what you’re seeing and hearing reported in the article you referenced represents a stronger inspection process that has been put in place.
I’ll let the chief amplify on this particular set at the unit involved, but generally, the inspection was satisfactory. But it was rated marginal in one area in particular, and this is an area where the group commander is following up after the inspection to make sure that the officers involved are focused as they need to be on all the details of their mission, and that they have appropriate focus exactly where it needs to be. So we support commanders following up on inspections with those actions that they think are necessary to maintain the highest professional standards for this work.
[snip]
SEC. DONLEY: First of all, we need to remember that these are lieutenants by and large. They — some of them can be new to the Air Force; they’re within their first few years. So the training process that we have for the nuclear mission is — has the highest standards but needs to be reinforced continually — every day, every week, every month — throughout the year, as there are new people coming in to the system. So the command responsibility to maintain visibility on this and to ride herd on young officers with this awesome responsibility is something — is something that we support. And in this instance the commander stepped in, said these people need refresher training. And so he took them offline to do that. And that is an appropriate command response.
[snip]
SEC. DONLEY: Senator, thank you. If I could make one comment on that, back to the missile incident — just a brief bit of context. The inspection that was conducted actually has 22 graded areas. The wing was rated excellent in 14 of those 22 and satisfactory in all but one of the others. And that one was an crew operations. They received a marginal rating, which is a passing score but clearly a flag to the leadership of the wing.
As a result of that, the group commander, the wing commander — who are both excellent officers, by the way, and excellent officers and doing exactly what I expect them to do — they followed up with additional testing, additional –
SEN. SHELBY: You’re talking about Colonel Vercher?
SEC. DONLEY: — I’m talking about Colonel Robert Vercher, yes, sir — to make sure that they didn’t have an issue they needed to deal with aggressively.
And as a result of that review, they decided that there was more of an attitude problem than a proficiency problem. And they are not willing to accept that, which is what I pay them for.
I believe this is the kind of commander intervention that prevents the incidents that occurred in 2007. They took very aggressive action early to make sure that there was no question in the mind of their crew force that marginal behavior or sort of satisfactory, just above the line, was not acceptable.
Now, there’s nothing good about the incident, Chairman. I’m not saying that. I’m just saying I like the way they responded. I wish they’d used different language in the email they sent. The word “rot” didn’t excite me, but it got my attention.
I don’t believe that that’s the problem. I don’t believe we have a nuclear surety risk at Minot Air Force Base. I believe we have commanders who are taking very aggressive action to ensure that never occurs. And in that respect, this is a good thing. The idea that we have people not performing to the standard we expect will never be good, and we won’t tolerate it.
SEN. SHELBY: But you’re basically saying that the commander, in this case Colonel Vercher at the top, was doing the proper thing in getting to it and following up on it and trying to correct it. Is that right?
GEN. WELSH: Yes, sir. That’s exactly what I’m saying.
We can disagree about whether tougher inspections will solve the problem — I have my doubts — but I do think we are all over-reacting to the results of a single inspection.
There is, by the way, a broader question of whether a morale problem exists at all. Matthew Vanderschuere – who spent five years as a Flight Commander in the 320th Missile Squadron (from 2007-2011 as best I can tell) — has argued that he didn’t see a morale crisis during his service:
Speaking broadly, after a five-year missile assignment, I observed that most of our top troops opted to fight for competitive slots to “stay in nukes.” Follow-on assignments to U.S. Strategic Command, ICBM Weapons School, or the 576th Flight Test squadron (which tests unarmed Minuteman III missiles over the Pacific) only went to the best missileers with the best resumes.
I don’t know what to say other than Vanderschuere’s anecdotal reporting differs from the anecdotal reporting in several of the reviews, including the Air Force Blue Ribbon Review and the Secretary of Defense Task Force, which both concluded that the missileers with the best resumes were leaving ICBM force for space operations. It is possible that the situation has improved since the Secretary of Defense Task Force visited FE Warren in 2008, that Vanderschuere is just an optimistic sort of guy, that F.E. Warren has unusually happy missileers, or even that the various reviews got it wrong.
One cautionary thought – Vanderschuere didn’t decide to stay in nukes himself. He’s now working on a PhD at American University, serving in the reserve. Presuming he was among the best and brightest, that’s at least one more anecdotal case of brain drain.
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